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We analyze the assessments of recent health reforms by the Congressional Budget Ofﬁce
(CBO) in the United States and the Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis (CPB) in the
Netherlands.
Both reforms aim to capitalize on productivity gains, which is appealing for policymakers
because of the potential for cost savings while maintaining – or enhancing – quality and
access. These measures however generally translate into more health care, rather than care
that is affordable and appropriate. Scoring agencies therefore have rightfully been reluctant
to assign signiﬁcant savings to these measures.
Thus with regard to cost savings, both agencies instead have favored more traditional
policy measures in the past. They are however increasingly mapping out loose ends and
dilemmas for payers, including information asymmetries, reputation issues and provider
business models that contradict the goals of policymakers. This calls for further exploring
this avenue and the development of more integrated agendas that might commit actors
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. Introduction
In an attempt to strike a better balance between accessi-
ility, costs and quality, health policy makers increasingly
ely on the forces of (quasi) competition to pursue pub-
ic objectives. Such reforms are studied extensively [1,2].
efore and while being implemented, these reforms are
ften assessed by (independent) economic scoring agen-
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cies. How economic agencies have evaluated these reforms
has not been systematically studied.
In this paper we analyze the assessments of the
Netherlands Bureau for Economic PolicyAnalysis (CPB) and
the US Congressional Budget Ofﬁce (CBO) in the period
before, during and after the major health care reforms of
the last decade. These reforms (the Dutch Health Insurance
Act of 2006 and the US Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act of 2010)were aimed at creating broad or universal
access, while also boosting productivity. Our explicit focus
is on the agencies’ assessments of the reforms, rather than
on the success of the reforms themselves.
Both bureaus have the task of assisting policymak-
ers and politicians with economic evidence. They directly
inﬂuence decision-making of the government and politi-
n access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.
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cal parties. A study of their projections is therefore highly
relevant. Politicians are often highly aware of the mod-
els used and – at least in the Netherlands – might even
reshape their proposals in an attempt to circumvent neg-
ative assessments (e.g. Smith et al. [3], White [4]). The
bureaus constantly reﬂect on their earlier projections.
Those reﬂections showus the continuous struggle to incor-
porate the latest scientiﬁc insights and offer assessments
that do justice to the ambition of policymakers for a health
system that is accessible, affordable and of good quality.
We present an analytical review on how the agencies
developed their thinking and assessment along the way on
the ﬁscal effects of the health reforms. Section 2 describes
how the Dutch CPB has assessed the Dutch health reforms.
Section 3 follows the same approach for the CBO and the
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act. Section 4 dis-
cusses the open ends anddilemmas the agencies, each in its
own way, uncover. Dilemmas that also challenge the clas-
sical assumptions of the agencieswith regard to cost saving
policies in health care. Section 5 concludes.
2. The Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy
Analysis (CPB) and health reform
The CPB provides economic forecasts on which the
government bases its ﬁscal policy at the start of, and
throughout a Cabinet period. The bureau also assesses
the election programs of political parties. The assess-
ment framework for health is relatively straightforward. It
projects a (regular) cost growth trajectory that is largely
based on historical data [5]. This is not without impor-
tance since it implies that past high cost growth rates breed
futureprojectedhighgrowth rates of health expenses.High
growth of health expenses in turn reduces the ﬁscal space
of other (discretionary) public services. If the base-line pro-
jection of health expenses come close to or are equal to the
total amount of ﬁscal space, political parties might seek
for savings to create room for other public services or spe-
ciﬁc cost increasingpriorities inhealth. Thebureauassesses
the budgetary impact of proposals of the respective politi-
cal parties, including budget cuts andbudgetary incentives.
We look at its successive projections in 2003, 2006, 2010
and 2012.
2.1. 2003: supporting health care reform proposals, but
reluctant to quantify potential savings
Around 2000, many political parties agreed that the
Dutch health system was in need of repair. Most volume
incentives had been eliminated and the strict budgeting
policy predictably led to long waiting lists and increased
pressure on the system [6]. A number of lawsuits were
ﬁled opposing the tardiness of the delivery of health care
services. The pressure on the government to change this
policy increased [7,8]. To eliminatewaiting lists, large sums
of money were injected into the system. Due to the high
level of spendingautonomyofproviders, policymakers and
politicians had little insight as to where the extra money
went [9].
While injecting extra money in the system was not very
efﬁcient in the short run, it would surely not be sustain-y 121 (2017) 1–8
able in the long run. In an effort to develop an alternative
approach, center and rightwing parties advocated a transi-
tion toward a competition-based delivery system [10,11].
Competition was believed to be the key to restoring labor
productivity, which in turn would lower the price of deliv-
ery. Sickness funds would be transformed into private
health insurers, which were supposed to compete among
each other for the best contracts to purchase health care
providers; and translate their bargaining powers into com-
petitive premiums and/or good quality of care. Planswould
be ﬁnanced through income- and employer-based contri-
butions, a monthly nominal premium (children would be
exempt), and general tax revenues. Tax subsidies would
support low-income individuals and families to purchase
health insurance.
The CPB has a very respected an inﬂuential position
on economic issues toward all policy stakeholders. As an
extraordinary task it then provided an extensive ‘qualita-
tive assessment’ of the conditions under which regulated
competition could be most successful [12,13]. It gave no
budgetary estimate of potential costs or beneﬁts of the
proposed transitions, although it legitimized the proposed
reform by linking it to potential efﬁciency gains and to
increasing transparency of the health care market.
The CPB explained its reluctance to quantify the eco-
nomic impact of the reforms. Long-term effects of the
transition were unknown. With foresight, the bureau
stated that an efﬁcient delivery system could also exert
upward pressure to overall expenditures through supplier-
induced demand, through an accelerated adoption of
cost-increasing technologies, less cost-effective treat-
ments, and through a greater number and diversity of
suppliers and associated services. To counterbalance these
risks, the bureau pointed to the possibility of higher
co-payments, but also suggested better protocols and
guidelines and degressive tariffs.
2.2. 2006: more conﬁdence in reforms
The health system reform became law in the elec-
tion year 2006 (Table 1 ). The CPB provided budgetary
estimates of the policy proposals within the election pro-
grams of the different political parties. The bureau granted
traditional proposals concerning deductibles, the beneﬁt
package, (lower) subsidies for lower income groups and
some efﬁciencymeasures [14]. However, this time, the CPB
also projected cost reductions as a result of the introduc-
tion of increased competition. Thus, the bureau became
more explicit in its assessment of efﬁciency gains through
market forces than it was in 2003. This also aligns with
the assignment of the bureau to explicitly score the ﬁs-
cal consequences of the political programs. The Christian
Democratic party for example pushed for a broad liberal-
ization of prices (up to 80% of hospital care) and larger risk
bearing responsibilities for insurers; theCPBestimated that
such aprice liberalizationwould allow insurers to recoupD
0,3 billion through productivity increases by 2011, climb-
ing to D 1,0 billion in 2018.
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Table 1
Main characteristics NL and US reforms.
Health Insurance Act (HIA) Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA)
Health care coverage - Individual mandate and community rating
- Nominal premium and income-related contribution
- Low-income subsidies through the Health Care
Allowance Act (WZT) Children (18−) exempt from
premium
- Risk Equalization Fund mitigates high risks for insurers
- Ex-ante and ex-post risk-adjustment (to be phased out
in 2017) for insurers
- Individual requirement to obtain health insurance, or
pay tax penalty
- Employer requirement to offer health insurance or pay
penalty
- Small businesses receive tax credits to offset premium
costs
- State health insurance marketplaces act as an
intermediary for individuals and small businesses
- Expanded eligibility for Medicaid
- Cost sharing support low-income individuals and
families
- Risk adjustment in the individual and small group
markets
Health care delivery - Managed care models including selective contracting - Advanced care delivery models including Accountable
Care Organizations (ACOs)
- Quality-based payment reforms
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n.3. 2010 and 2012: reluctance in granting productivity
ains returns
At the time of the elections of 2010, the ﬁrst results of
he health care reform were visible. The system did indeed
xperience a productivity leap and the number of treat-
ents rose in the years after 2006 [15]. However, these
roductivity gains had not yet led to cost savings: health
xpenditures maintained a steep trajectory, at least until
009–2011 (see Fig. 1).
Although negotiable prices of hospitals decreased, this
id not lead to a slowing growth rate of total hospital costs.
his points toward the idea that freed up capacity might
ave been deployed to treat more patients.
One seemed to have overlooked the risk of productiv-
ty incentives related to the reform of the remuneration
f medical specialists. Starting in 2008, specialists were
emunerated based on a ﬁxed hourly tariff multiplied by
standardized number of minutes for each DRG. This part
f the DRG prices had been ﬁxed, even if productivity gains
ould occur. Costs grew immediately. In 2009–2010 the
ayment-system was reversed: an income cap for medi-
al specialists was introduced [17]. The cost impact in the
ollowing years was signiﬁcant and the growth of hospital
osts declined [18,19].
In their assessment of the election programs of the
lections of 2010 and 2012, the bureau’s reluctance to
rant savings through proposed system reforms returned
20,21]. In 2010, this was the case for parties that proposed
o further liberalize DRG-prices, as well as for parties that
roposed rigorous steps towardaone-payer system.Atﬁrst
ight, the CPB only accepted straightforward policy pro-
osals, such as raising the deductible, limiting the insured
eneﬁt package, and cutting salaries of hospital manage-
ent and specialists.
Perhaps recognizing that supplier-induced demand
ight explain why productivity gains tended to be trans-
ated into higher rather than lower cost growth, the CPB
ow – for the ﬁrst time – also acknowledged costs savings- Quality improvement programs for Medicare and
Medicare Advantage
for initiatives focused on the quality and appropriate-
ness (and thus the quantity) of care: inter alia via the
establishmentof aNationalHealthCare Institute. This insti-
tute would be the Dutch alternative for NICE in the UK,
assigned with plotting out the roadmap to ‘appropriate
care’ and thereby counteracting supplier-induced demand
(CPB [20,p. 49] and subsequent analyses of the proposals
of the parties). This was consistent with the aforemen-
tioned publication of 2003, in which the CPB pointed at
the introduction of protocols and guidelines as a means to
avoid supplier-induced demand and the enhancement of
low value (less cost-efﬁcient) care.
In 2012 this issue came back, but now labeled as the
strict management of the basic insurance coverage. Nearly
all political parties proposed to manage the basic beneﬁt
package more strictly, which the CPB granted with ex-ante
savings. TheNationalHealthCare Institutewas established,
possibly paving the way for accepting ‘appropriate care’-
like efﬁciency measures. Two new elements appeared in
the election programs and the assessments of the CPB:
1. A ‘macro controlling instrument’ (MCI): ameasureof last
resort, which the government can impose in case of a
budgetary overrun. Providers then need to refund the
percentage overrun, standardized by their own market
share [22];
2. National or regional concentration of emergency and
high-cost care. The CPB granted some minor savings for
this concentration-of-care-agenda (e.g. CPB [21,p. 95]),
although in earlier publications it had warned for the
construction of monopolies (e.g. CPB [12,p. 103–105]).
These two instruments ﬁt into a national and political
agendaof cost containment that tries to limit the expansion
at the supply side of the health care sector. This illustrates
a shift away from the dominant market-orientation. This
shift is also visible in a study of the Ministry of Finance in
collaboration with the CPB, published in 2012 as well [23].
The authors point to the fact that payers (insurance com-
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panies) do not know where productivity gains evolved and
what kind of care has added value (information asymme-
try). And if they knew, they would not be able to reduce the
services – thus translating productivity gains into cost sav-
ings – because of their reputation problems. People would
believe protesting doctors and distrust insurance compa-
nies.
To sum up we see that the bureau scores tradition ﬁscal
tools in healthcare such as reductions of the beneﬁt basket
or an increase in out-of-pocket payments consistently, but
struggles more with the scores of policy incentives such
as competition, transparency or limiting supply-induced
demand. This approach seemsunderstandable, sincedeter-
mining the budgetary impact of health systems’ change is
associated with high levels of uncertainty in terms of the
realization of theproposedbudget cuts.Wenow turn to the
CBO to determine how this agency has dealt with a similar
reform.
3. The CBO in an era of health transitions
3.1. 2009/2010: Patient Protection and Affordable Care
Act (PPACA)
The CBO, together with the Joint Committee on Tax-
ation (JCT), provides budgetary estimates of government
policies. In 2009 and the following years it looked at the
provisions in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care
Act (ACA) and the impact these would have on the fed-
eral budget (and total health care costs as a percentage of
the GDP) [24]. The many changes that occurred as a result
of the legislative process and the judicial procedures were
systematically scrutinized by the CBO and the JCT.
Extra spending was largely driven by the eligibility of
non-elderly people to Medicaid with incomes from below
100% to below 138% of the federal poverty level (FPL); and
by federal subsidies for people with incomes up to 400%
of the FPL to reduce their costs of obtaining private health
insurance coverage through so called exchanges.rlands and the OECD (average) between 1995 and 2015.
Other provisions in the ACA were deemed to reduce
federal spending. Alternative reimbursements schemes for
MedicareAdvantage (partC),were supposed to reducepay-
ments to private insurance. A major source of savings was
supposed to come from a set of provisions that would per-
manently reduce the annual updates of Medicare payment
rates. Those updates would equal the percentage change
in the prices of providers inputs (such as labor and equip-
ment) minus the 10-year moving average of growth in
productivity in the overall economy [25,p. 37,26,p. 29].
The CBO did not grant savings for some of the more eye
catching reform elements thatwere aimed to generate cost
savings in the long run. For example, the establishment of
‘accountable care organizations’ and a national pilot pro-
gram to develop approaches to bundling the payments
for an episode of care during and after hospitalization.
The CBO argued that these ‘experiments’ need much more
reﬁnement ‘before signiﬁcant savings will be achieved’
[25,p. 37,26,p. 36]. A recent study corroborates their ini-
tial assessment, as savings for these programs so far seem
to have been modest [27]. The CBO nevertheless granted
ex ante savings to most reform proposals, albeit somewhat
hesitant: ‘CBO expects that, [. . .] Medicare spending per
beneﬁciary will increase at an average annual rate of less
than 2% during the next two decades, compared with a
roughly 4% annual growth rate during the past twodecades
[. . .]. It is unclear whether that lower rate of growth can
be sustained and, if so, whether it will be accomplished
through greater efﬁciencies in the delivery of health care
orwill instead reduce access to care or diminish the quality
of care (relative to the situation under prior law).’
3.2. 2015: SGR, productivity gains and underlying cost
development and payment reformsParallel to discussions on the ACA reforms, continued a
debate around the SustainableGrowthRate (SGR) that gov-
erns the payment for physicians’ services under Medicare.
The SGR was created to ensure that the yearly Medicare
lth Polic
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xpense increase per beneﬁciary would not exceed GDP
rowth. If expenditures deviate from this target, a con-
ersion factor would decrease the payments for physician
ervices.
In its successive long-term projection, the CBO system-
tically argues that in the longer term some measures still
ight not turn out to be as successful as hoped for. The SGR
ad been systematically overridden by congress, allow-
ng for the development of a considerable potential cut in
hysician fees (up to 21% in 2014). However, this seemed
olitically unfeasible.
Secondly, the CBO reﬂects once more on the unpre-
ictable effects of the annual updates to Medicare’s
ayment rates for health care providers (other than physi-
ians) in the fee-for-service portion of the program along
ith the correction of prices with the aforementioned
0-year moving average of growth in productivity in the
conomy overall. If the enforced payment updates under
ompensate the actual productivity gains in health care,
his could lead to lower quality care for Medicare bene-
ciaries, or reduce enrollee’s access to care. In that case a
ise in expenditures to compensate for a decrease in quality
r access, might still be inevitable. Eventually, this ques-
ionswhethermoderate cost growth is sustainable over the
onger run. CBO points to the fact that studies on produc-
ivity gains show mixed results. Although, some point out
hat the productivity of numerous medical services (apart
rom physicians) has aligned with increases in the GDP
rice index for decades (e.g. CBO [26,p. 37]), suggesting
hat this approachwould be sustainable. Also, hospitals see
ncreased margins in 2011 compared to 1991, while Medi-
are and private insurers generally have not reimbursed
bove the average price index.
Long-termprojections of federal spending for thediffer-
ntprograms–Medicare,Medicaid, and subsidiesprovided
hrough the insurance exchanges – are based on pro-
ections of the number of beneﬁciaries per program and
pending growth per beneﬁciary [26,p. 37]. CBO calculates
he growth in health care spending per person relative
o the growth of potential GDP per person after remov-
ng the effects of demographic changes on health care
pending—in particular, changes in the population’s age
istribution. The resulting ratio of those growth rates is
eferred to as excess cost growth. CBO expects that the
CA may temporarily reduce the excessive growth rate.
owever, once the policy measures will have been fully
ncorporated – according to CBO in 2024 – the long-term
rend of cost-growth will be reinstated. Private sector,
tate governments and Medicare will then have to take
ction again, since ‘health care expenditures cannot rise
ore quickly than GDP forever’ [26,p. 35]. In this context
BO mentions the traditional tool set again: higher out-of-
ocket costs, a more active role of employers in making
ealth care more efﬁcient, limiting insurances coverage
r offering a ﬁxed contribution that employees can use to
urchase health insurance, lower subsidies for low income
roups, lower reimbursement rates and prices, etc. [25,p.
4,26,p. 35–37]. CBO trusts that these instruments will
urb the cost curve in the longer term. At the same time,
he bureau does state that there are caveats: ‘more gen-
rally, making appropriate changes in ﬁnancial incentivesy 121 (2017) 1–8 5
will probably be critical in developing successful policies
to restrain spending growth. In many cases, the current
health care system does not provide incentives for doc-
tors, hospitals, and other providers of health care – or their
patients – to control costs. Although the recent legislation
took some initial steps toward modifying those incentives,
more substantial changeswill probablybeneeded to signif-
icantly lower the future trajectory of health care spending.
For example, given the key role of medical technology in
contributing to spending growth, slowing the growth of
spending over the long termwill probably require decreas-
ing the pace of adopting new treatments and procedures
or limiting the breadth of their application. Such changes
need not involve explicit rationing but could occur as a
result of market mechanisms or policy changes that affect
the incentives to develop and use more costly treatments’
[25,p. 46].
4. Discussion: three dilemmas and possible ways
forward
The CBO tried to assess the implications of the afore-
mentioned correction of prices with the 10-year moving
average of growth in productivity in the economy over-
all. Lower quality care or reduced access to care might
be the result if the productivity gains in health care do
not match the average growth of productivity. The CBO
also points to the downsides of productivity incentives in
payment schemes. When providers receive lower prices,
they generally attempt to maintain their level of income
by boosting volumes. Studies of supply induced demand of
the CBO reveal this practice: at a 1000 dollar loss through
pricemeasures, there is generally speaking a compensation
mechanism through volumes of around 280 dollar [28,p.
4]. In general, surgery appears to be the most responsive to
suchchanges: a1000dollar loss inpricesversusa890dollar
increase in volume. There is another mechanism working
aswell: price pressure requiresworking efﬁciently, as time
is money. But this usually results in less time for discussing
the appropriateness of care with a patient; general prac-
titioners referring patients to a specialist much quicker
and specialists are incentivized to over diagnose and over
treat [29]. There is an imminent threat that price pressure
translates into an increased need for production in order
to compensate the loss of revenues, which then boosts the
introduction of new technologies: the big driver of health
care costs (CBO’s annual outlooks e.g. 2010–1015 [36–38]).
CBO assesses that not every new supply is equally useful.
‘Many experts believe that a substantial share of current
health care spending is of low value, meaning that the ser-
vices provided yield little health beneﬁt relative to their
costs. If the use of such services fell, the rate of excess cost
growth could also decline for an extended period without
imposing direct costs on patients. However, reducing the
use of low-value care without affecting high-value care is
very challenging, so the degree to which such a reduction
might occur is highly uncertain’ [30,p. 38]. The samemech-
anisms will be provoked if the price reductions are lower
than the overall productivity gains in the health care sec-
tor. The extra capacity after all will be used to offer more
services as well [31].
lth Polic6 A. Klink et al. / Hea
CBO and the CPB come to similar conclusions: pay-
ment schemes and pressure for efﬁciency on the side of
providers, result in a quick adoption of innovations and of
additional care services. Both bureaus arewell aware of the
fact that the extra servicesmight result in lower value care.
However in certain cases this might even lead to no-value
orevennegativevaluecare [32].Quantityofhealthcare ser-
vices seems to be at the core of the problems of health care
costs. Beating cost growth by capitalizing on productivity
gainswith a pricing instrument is a deﬁcientmethod, given
the dynamics that it provokes of supply induced demand.
This is especially important since the ‘vague’ notion that
innovations are one of the biggest superchargers of costs
easily results in a reluctance at the level of payers to invest
in them. Becoming more speciﬁc on the potential impact
of innovations on well-being (appropriate care) and costs
ﬁts into an agenda that focuses on the quantity of care and
less (although it stillwill be important) onprice regulations
[31].At least three importantdilemmaspresent themselves
that interfere with such a strategy.
4.1. Dilemma: supply is only partly evidence based, and
there is no clear right or wrong
Medical supply is not always evidence based. We may
not know which patient beneﬁts from a speciﬁc treatment
and which patient does not. In this gray – and highly costly
– area it is not only difﬁcult to determine what efﬁcient,
but evenmore sowhat useful care is. There are information
shortages and information asymmetries. Both the CPB and
theCBOpoint to the importanceof informationasymmetry.
Limiting thebeneﬁtpackageandcreatinggeneral guide-
lines alone will not solve this issue. After all, a lot of care
cannot become evidence based. To the extent that evi-
dence is available, it is not translated rapidly enough into
guidelines. Even more importantly, the appropriateness of
care varies per person and often cannot be described in
the generic terms of guidelines. When reform proposals
were accompanied by institutional safeguards (the MCI,
the establishment of a National Health Care Institute), the
CPB was willing to accept the cost cutting potential of
certain productivity measures. Thus the lesson is that pol-
icymakers that seek for cost savings through increased
productivity need to design tight and enforceable institu-
tional layers that control for an uncontrolled expansion of
services.
4.2. Dilemma: volume incentives for providers boost
access, but fuel overtreatment
Activity-based payment mechanisms incentivize vol-
ume. The threat of less revenue in the near future results
easily in higher production and over treatment. This is
a clear dilemma as volume incentives are indispensable
attributes to avoid waiting lists and increase productivity.
Countering the tendency toward volume increase is difﬁ-
cult to attain due to the differing interests of players. This
reverse dynamic makes cost containment particularly dif-
ﬁcult to attain. Given the gray area in health care delivery,
providers will always have the incentive to partially com-
pensate loss of revenue: regardless of whether this loss isy 121 (2017) 1–8
caused by price cuts, loss of demand due to higher out-of-
pocket cost, or a smaller insured beneﬁt package, etc.
4.3. Dilemma: reputation of payers and the ‘beneﬁts’ of
unconditionally expanding providers
Physicians and patients will accept an authorization
policy by insurers, only if cases are perfectly straightfor-
ward. Even if payers are aware of best practices in terms of
appropriate care, they will often be confronted with a rep-
utation problem when scaling up. Patients and providers
generally have little trust in insurers in this regard. As a
result of lack of trust, steering patient volumes to providers
thatprovideappropriate care isbarelypossible. Thedemor-
alizing result is that providers that opt for appropriate
and efﬁcient care have less revenue than their colleagues
that expand services more unconditionally. Providers that
are efﬁcient and only want to provide appropriate care
can nonetheless be confronted with a cut due to a gen-
eral budgetary overrun, provoked by organizations that
are inefﬁcient and/or offer inappropriate care. The lesson
is that a volume driven system will increase productivity
but does not align with cost savings through value-based
care [33]. This suggests that a more quality or performance
oriented reimbursement and/or contracting policy is nec-
essary.
With respect to cashing in on appropriate and efﬁ-
cient care, parties seem to be held hostage by each other.
Insurers ﬁnd it difﬁcult to gain knowledge on efﬁcient
and especially appropriate care. Best practices are often
initiated and driven by idealistic and intrinsically moti-
vated physicians. It is difﬁcult to systematically develop
and implement thesebestpractices, as they impact revenue
streams of providers. Intrinsically motivated hospitals and
physicians are trapped in the system and see competitors
increase their revenue streams, also if the latter provide
lesser quality services [31].
4.4. Back at where we began?
Incentives for production are needed to increase
productivity. However, productivity gains are not sponta-
neously (fully) translated into lower prices, and freed up
capacity is used to offer more services. Costs will not only
increase because of too modest price reductions, but also
because we get more of the services that are (too) expen-
sive. The lack of price and cost transparency is a recurring
complaint in health care. The lack of transparency in the
ﬁeld of appropriateness of care is an even bigger prob-
lem. Increasedproductioncaneasily result in inappropriate
and no value care or – even worse – negative and harmful
outcomes: a negative marginal utility. The aspect of low
marginal utility is certainly an aspect in the projections and
analyses of the CPB aswell as the CBO.However, they speak
about low value care and cost-ineffectiveness but not of
inappropriate care and of possible negative marginal util-
ity of services. Scoring agencies act as referees that support
evidence-based policymaking instead of advocates for cer-
tain directions of policy. A crucial role that is also highly
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alued. However, the lack of transparency and the high
evels of information asymmetry make this a difﬁcult task.
.5. Alternatives to circumvent these dilemmas
When providers align their ambitions with payers that
lso strive for better care and lower costs it must be pos-
ible to develop an agenda of appropriate care. When
ayers forestall the negative incentives of revenue reduc-
ion, thesewell-chosen providers can systematically create
benchmark of practices of appropriate care and solve
art of the aforementioned information asymmetry ‘prob-
em’. This can for example be done through a) a revenue
uarantee for a number of years, or b) different forms of
ain sharing and c) by compensating the loss of revenue
y shifting patient streams, by which d) the turnover of
hose providers that do not want to incorporate optimal
are diminishes. With these policies payers are able to cre-
te living labs, while scaling up the good practices through
ompetition between providers: those who accommodate
o this agenda of appropriate care get the better contracts.
ulti provider systems are a prerequisite for this agenda.
onopolies can resist the contracting power of payers,
ot only in the ﬁeld of the volume (and the appropriate-
ess) of care but also regarding price setting. It is however
aramount that contracting policies of payers account for
he behavioral dynamics of providers once they are con-
ronted with price cuts.
In the US and the Netherlands initiatives pop up around
iving labs and accountable care organizations. However,
BO and CPB rightly do not yet incorporate the outcomes
f these institutional innovations in their ﬁscal projections.
oth bureaus point to institutional obstacles when aiming
o let society as a whole beneﬁt from productivity gains
ssociated with new technologies and more efﬁcient and
ppropriate care. The fact that they increasingly map out
hese obstacles, is beneﬁcial: it is now up to the payers
o alleviate these barriers together with physicians and
roviders and work toward an agenda of efﬁcient and
ppropriate care, in the interest of patients who remain
entral to the health care delivery system [31].
. Conclusion
In this article we have discussed the ways in which the
conomic scoring agencies in the US and the Netherlands
ave evaluated the budgetary consequences of major
ealth reforms of the past ten years. Both reforms aim
o generate cost savings through productivity gains, while
aintaining – or enhancing – quality and access. These
easures however generally translate into more health
are, rather than care that is affordable and appropriate.
e have seen that both theCBOand theCPBwere rightfully
eluctant to assign signiﬁcant savings to these measures.
Thus with regard to cost savings, both agencies instead
ave favored more traditional policy measures in the past.
hey are however increasingly mapping out loose ends
nd dilemmas for payers, including information asymme-
ries, reputation issues and provider business models that
ontradict the goals of policymakers. This calls for further
xploring this avenue and the development of more inte-
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grated agendas that might commit actors and the spread of
best practices.
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